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The purpose of IT audit reports is to inform the 
company’s executives of the revealed situation, let them 
know of the possible deficiencies, and preferably to 
offer ways of solution. Obviously though, the decisions 
have to be made by the executives themselves.
It is a common and serious problem that managers 
are not provided with all the necessary information to 
make their decisions regarding information technology 
issues. This is true in spite of the fact that audit reports 
present a description of the areas with higher risks, the 
risk factors in these fields and often the possible solutions 
as well. Audit reports do not help in the decision which 
areas the limited resources should be invested in for 
effective treatment. Decision-makers often make the 
allocation of different resources in an ad hoc manner 
to cure the diverse problems. In their decision, they 
mainly rely on their previous experiences.
Another problem, although its cause is basically 
the same, is that the results achieved by different audit 
processes, especially the ones regarding risk levels, 
are not comparable with each other. As there is no 
commonly agreed regulation for the assessment of risks, 
the evaluation is usually made in a highly subjective 
manner (Ozier, 2003). Thus, even if numerical indices 
are available concerning certain areas, they cannot 
be compared to other cases, as another auditor might 
reach different results, even if the method and the 
investigated problems are the same. The risk levels in 
the results of different audits made in different periods 
in the same organization, or different companies in the 
same industry, are not comparable.
According to the assumption made in this research 
a metrics that is based on a widespread methodology 
and that secures more precise measurement and 
comparability of different risks, helps in optimizing 
corporate resource-allocation in the areas involved, 
and – thanks to this and the benchmarking capabilities 
– enhancing the efficiency, numerical representation 
and verifiability of company decisions based on the 
audit results.
An additional achievement is that by calculating 
the risk levels more precisely the results of previous 
audit processes can be used to more accurately delimit 
the areas of interest. Therefore auditing knowledge 
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might be reused in order to make more specific audit 
plans. This paper describes the steps taken to verify 
this assumption and also its consequences regarding 
knowledge reusability.
The usability of knowledge in auditing
The goals of auditing
The main goal of an information technology audit, 
similarly to other methods of supervision, is to examine 
compliance. Thus, to check whether the processes, 
control and operation of the inspected areas comply 
with some kind of predefined regulations. Therefore, 
there are only two kinds of results of an audit process: 
complying or not complying.
The intention in regulating corporate operation 
is to restrain the different operational risks in order 
to achieve the strategic goals. Obviously to make 
compliance measurable in a suitable way, controls must 
be built into the company’s processes. In our case these 
are derived from the Control Objectives of COBIT, 
the methodology that has been used as a basis for the 
research.
But the question that is one of the key issues of this 
research arises: to what extent does the appropriate 
selection of controls (control objectives) enhance risk 
reduction? Do the appropriate narrowing down of the 
area of focus or the amount of questions that have to be 
examined result in the cost-effective reduction of risks 
derived from corporate IT? If the knowledge gained in 
previous audits is used to articulate the self-reflection 
of the assessment system, does it help in selecting the 
right control objectives?
Audit plans based on previous experiences
We might presume that the use of risk assessment 
metrics during IT auditing contributes to the 
optimization of the allocation of corporate resources. 
Executives responsible for IT governance are in 
a difficult position when they have to decide on 
countermeasures against risks (Trites, 2004). Without 
an appropriate measurement method it is hard to 
precisely determine the desirable use of resources. The 
metrics creates a chance to make optimal decisions on 
the use of resources.
Our assumption was that if the self-reflecting nature 
of the execution of IT audits is formulated explicitly, the 
results can be reused to improve and more accurately 
specify the audit plans.
Information technology audit is essentially based on 
previous experiences. Most methodologies (including 
ITIL, Common Criteria, COSO ERM and also COBIT) 
are actually a collection of best practices (ITIL, 1989; 
CC, 1999; COSO, 2004). Therefore, the data from 
different audits is obviously worth to be used to more 
precisely define the assessment method. According to 
our assumption, the refinement can be carried out if the 
results of previous audits are used in an appropriate 
way.
Risk assessment metrics as a tool for knowledge 
reuse
The primary goal of this research was the creation 
of a risk assessment metrics based on a widely spread 
methodology, which might be used in information 
technology auditing, and optionally the creation of 
a software system that might be of use in the audit 
process by providing support for the auditors. After 
the appropriate methodological funding and the choice 
of methods, the research has been mainly of practical 
nature, as on basis of the principal background, the 
assessment method was constructed, as well as the 
scaling and the tool that provides the necessary support 
for the users. 
There were several prerequisites of the research. 
First, a comprehensive collection of the possible risks 
had to be created that could be used as the foundation of 
the assessment. Second, the appropriate measurement 
and ranking method had to be shaped, namely the 
metrics that is capable of the evaluation of the risk 
factors and the totalling on certain areas.
As the goal was to create a method that can be used in 
many areas, the definition of risks also had to be as wide 
as possible. To reach this goal an audit methodology 
had to be selected that is both widespread and detailed 
enough so the certain risks could be generated with its 
use in a direct or indirect way. 
There is only one comprehensive audit methodology 
that fulfils the above criteria, which is accepted by most 
experts, covers the most possible areas, but at the same 
time is suitable for the deconstruction so the risk factors 
can be reached. This is the COBIT methodology, issued 
by ITGI and ISACA (COBIT, 2000). Although there 
has been some criticism on the completeness of the 
threats to information integrity mentioned in COBIT 
(Boritz, 2005), this is obviously the methodology that 
covers most of the areas in question.
On the other hand, COBIT does not originally include 
such deconstruction that would allow the direct analysis 
of risks. Although it provides serious help in creating 
the control questions on risks, the extraction of actual 
risk factors from this standard needed further work.
The other task was the creation of the metrics itself. 
The method is described below.
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To make the metrics functional, the calibration of 
the method had to be done. This was assured by the 
execution of several measurements and the recording 
and comparison of data. The operation of the index was 
tested with the use of Monte Carlo simulation.
Creating the index
The aim of the research has been to create a method 
that allows the certain determination of the risk level 
regarding the examined company; thus, the making of 
a risk index that defines the risk level, based on the data 
collected during the audits.
In order to reach this goal, the widely used 
guidelines of COBIT were used as a research basis. 
In its construction, COBIT (3rd edition) contains 34 
control objectives grouped in four domains. The control 
objectives cover practices to follow that are important 
in the information security and effective operation of 
the company. As further specification, these contain 
more than 300 detailed control objectives, which 
are to specify and more precisely define the higher-
level objectives. Although the 4th edition of COBIT 
has been published recently, the basic concept has not 
changed.
According to its objective, COBIT covers every 
area related to corporate information technology, 
therefore the risk factors may be considered as the 
most comprehensive possible. This is the reason why 
the detailed control objectives of COBIT were taken as 
a basis for the identification of risks in this research.
COBIT makes the evaluation of control objectives 
possible only by assigning levels of 1 to 5 (0 in 
the case of non-applicable) to them, based on the 
capability-maturity models. This results a variable 
that is measurable only on an ordinal scale that is not 
appropriate for calculating averages or other statistical 
indices. For the sake of easier usage, these evaluations 
can be taken into consideration in a way that the risk 
linked to the control objective raises or lowers the risk 
of the company (or some of its parts). 
The main concept of the risk assessment method 
is the following: the auditor assigns the capability-
maturity levels regarding the individual factors on 
the area in focus (There have been attempts to create 
metrics based on this concept (Jelen, 2000)). Relying 
on these the decision can be made whether the certain 
factor raises or lowers the risk level. As a starting point, 
the acceptance threshold, namely the line between 
raising and lowering is 2.5, which is only used as a 
parameter in the model. Based on these data, the risk 
level of the investigated area can be defined with the 
use of a certain algorithm.
The most straightforward algorithm is the 
calculation of a simple mean. In this case the values 
of +1 and -1 are added, which show the contribution to 
the risk level. Obviously, this method is not capable of 
supplying refined data and it is not useful in practice, 
as one cannot state the equal importance of all factors. 
With the use of this simple method, it is inevitable that 
such factors extinguish each other that are obviously 
of different importance in real life. With the use of a 
method like that, it is impossible to define the areas 
where the resources have to be concentrated upon, as 
all problems appear to be of same severity.
As a result the introduction of importance weights was 
also necessary. With this method, which appears in most 
of the known risk assessment tools as well, it is possible 
for the auditor to consider the different importances 
of the individual factors. There are several methods to 
assign the weights (Hwang – Shin – Han, 2004); the 
choice between these is not part of this research.
To use this method, the allocation of appropriate 
weights is also expected from the person carrying 
out the audit; thus, the creation of a weighted average 
can be done. In the research, the making of the 
weights can rely on the scenarios. Namely, during the 
examination such sets were defined that determine the 
areas to be analyzed in certain industries (e.g. banks, 
manufacturing etc.). The weights of the examined areas 
are also expected to be different in these cases.
Mapping the interactions
At the same time, the allocation of weights does not 
solve another important problem: the interaction of risk 
factors. During the research, the conclusion was drawn 
that the assessment of risks can be much more precise 
if the factors are not regarded independent, but their 
relationships are also taken into account. 
To reach this goal the effects of the coexistence of two 
simultaneous factors had to be mapped. For example it 
could be defined how the overall risk index is going to 
be affected by the coexistence of the two factors when 
the quality of the plan on IT strategy is a factor raising 
the risks and the qualification of the personnel is a 
factor lowering the risks. Obviously, these estimations 
cannot be done in a totally faultless way. As there are 
no historical data on regarding these questions, expert 
estimations had to be relied on. At the same time this 
is not opposed to the viewpoint of COBIT, as this is 
a collection of empirical knowledge, therefore its 
individual statements are not unquestionable.
As a result of the detailed discovery work, an 
interaction matrix was created that contains these 
simultaneous effects (see table 1).
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On this basis, it was possible to develop the 
assessment procedure further. The determination 
of the risk index is done in such way that the 
capability-maturity indices and risk factors defined 
by the auditors are considered in selecting the certain 
elements of the matrix and the results are cumulated. 
The meaning of the certain squares of the matrix is 
made clear by table 2.
The upper left field shows the value that is appointed 
to the risk index when both factors in question perform 
in a positive way – in this case in the example, their 
coexistence lowers the overall risk (the positive number 
means the raising of security, therefore the lowering of 
risks). In the upper right field, the factor shown in the 
column on the left is positive and the one shown in the 
row on the top is negative. The other fields are also 
filled up according to the figure.
The algorithm of the index
By totalling and weighting the appropriate elements 
of the interaction matrix, the risk index can be created. 
The totalling can be carried out using the following for-
mula:
In which R is the overall risk index, wi is the weight 
of the certain risk factors, ri is the converted value of 
the risk index (-1or +1) and ri,j is the value created from 
the first-order interaction of the risk factors by the use 
of the above matrix (might be –1, 0 or +1).
Thus, the formula creates a weighted average of 
the risk indices including the interactions as well. The 
value ri is emphasized, as that is the direct contribution 
of the certain risk factor to the cumulated risk level. In 
fact this is the self-interaction of factor i, which is not 
else but its own risk value.
The benefit of the procedure is that the value of the 
index can be easily calculated for certain sub-domains 
as well, thus for the subset of overall risk consisting 
of some control objectives. The overall risk index then 
can be created by simply totalling these.
Table 1.
A section of the interaction matrix
Table 2
Legend for the interaction matrix
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In case the auditor finds it hard to assign weights to 
certain areas with a total of 1, a transformation can be 
executed easily. Therefore it is possible to use practically 
any kinds of weighting, if the individual weights are 
divided by the total of weight values; namely, if the 
weights are normalized.
It might appear so that during the cumulating each 
risk interaction is considered twice, but this pheno-
menon is parried by the use of appropriate weighting. 
The attribution of weights is done according to the 
weights of parent-factors given by the auditor, and 
during the cumulating, the weights of individual risk 
factors (control objectives) are used.
The simulation experiment
Because of the lack of relevant data, Monte Carlo 
simulation was used during the research. The simulation 
and the generation of the results were carried out in 
several steps. 
Scenarios
First, the formulation of 4 different scenarios took 
place, representing certain audit situations. Thus, the 
model of the examination of a bank, a manufacturer, a 
service company and a software development firm was 
created in such way that the detailed control objectives 
to be examined were identified depending on practical 
experience. 
The importance of the creation of these scenarios 
regarding the goals of this research is that the different 
risk assessment methods may be distinguished from the 
aspect of their usability in diverse auditing situations. 
With the help of the scenarios, further peculiarities 
specific to the certain areas might be observed as 
well.
Random samples
Next, 500 random samples were created in order to 
represent the capability-maturity values defined in the 
auditing process. Equal distribution of the values was 
assumed when creating the random numbers, which 
means that each of the evaluation levels (measured 
on a scale of 0 to 5) had the same chance to be in 
the sample. Naturally, during further research, it is 
possible to change the distribution and make further 
analysis.
Random numbers were generated for the scenarios 
as well. In order to assure the comparability of the 
results, the same cases were used, thus each of the 500 
cases used in the scenarios are shortlists of the random 
values created for the whole of the control objectives.
Conversion
In the next step the evaluations were transformed 
into the values +1 and –1, where +1 stands for the 
growth of security and –1 for its decrease, therefore 
the raising level of risks. There were two reasons to 
make this conversion: first, the values measured on an 
ordinal scale are obviously not usable directly to create 
numerical values – e.g. averages; second, the concept 
of the research was to make a separation of factors 
depending on whether they raise or decrease overall 
risk. Thus, the set of simulated data is divided in two 
groups depending on the acceptance threshold.
In the simulation, this threshold was 2.5, which 
is the middle of the range of values. As this is only 
a parameter of the model, this might be changed in 
further research. The threshold had been set at that 
level, as this made the enabled the allocation of equally 
distributed variables in two groups of the same size. 
However, if the distribution is changed, the shifting 
of the acceptance threshold might be needed. This 
is considerable also, because the value 0 is a special 
measure in the capability-maturity models, as this 
stands for not applicable.
Calculating the risk indices
The following step was the creation of the risk 
indices from the generated and transformed values. 
In order to do that, equally distributed weights had to 
be rendered to the factors, which were normalized to 
total 1. There are different weights attributed to each 
of the cases, therefore 500 different set of weights were 
used.
Four different indices were created in the research: 
In the creation of the mean, simply the +1 and –1 
values were averaged in each of the cases.
In the construction of the weighted average, the +1 
and –1 values rendered to the control objectives were 
averaged with the use of the constructed weights.
In the index created with respect to the interactions, 
the respective elements of the interaction matrix 
(therefore the intersections rendered to the +1 and –1 
values of the control objectives) are averaged.
Finally the creation of the R index, the goal of the 
research, was done. This index is created with respect 
ot the interactions and the different weights of the 
control objectives. 
The calculation of the risk indices was made for 
each of the cases in the sample of 500 for all of the 
control objectives (thus, the risk factors), and also for 
the different scenarios. In this way, 500*5*4=10000 in-
dex values were created. 
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Statistical analysis
In the final step, the statistical analysis of the 
cumulated risk indices regarding the risk factors in the 
whole of the sample and also in each of the scenarios 
was made. With the help of these, it was possible to 
compare the different assessment methods concerning 
their basic attributes, and also the verification of 
the examined hypotheses. The statistical indices 
were created using SPSS software. The histograms 
illustrating the behaviour of the respective indices 
seriously support the analysis.
Results
The main results of the simulation experiment are 
the following: The average values of the indices created 
with respect to the interactions (the expected values of 
the variables) are shifted towards the negative values. 
This means that, by the use of the index suggested here, 
the risks of the organization in question might appear 
bigger than in the case of simple averaging. Namely, the 
shift towards the negative direction means that the value 
of the security index is lower. This is natural, and it 
reflects one of the main principles of auditing: prudence. 
This is the consequence of the fact that in cases where 
it was hard to decide on the effect of the interactions, 
negative values were preferred to be safe. This can also 
become clear by totalling the elements of the interaction 
matrix, as the result is a negative number.
The variation of the indices created with respect 
to interactions is higher than in the cases of simple 
averages. This additional variation calculated on basis 
of the matrix extended with fist- order interactions 
compared to the basic situation is generated by the 
simultaneous occurrence of risk factors. In this research, 
only the first-order relationships could be analysed. The 
additional variation generated by the second and higher 
order interactions could also be analysed one by one, 
but this is beyond the limitations of the present research. 
This is why Monte Carlo simulation had to be employed 
that allows the estimation of the effects of higher order 
interactions, therefore all further indirect impacts.
The operational strategy for moderation of risks 
and the goals of the IT function can be based on the 
intention to lower the additional variation discovered 
in the above-mentioned way. The importance of the 
method introduced in this paper is the capability of 
identifying such strategic focus points in addition 
to the explicitly formulated primary risks, which are 
impossible to discover without this approach.
By analysing the results of the simulation, the 
statement can be made that the positive or negative 
sign of the index considering the risk interaction is 
very seldom different from that of the simple average 
– only in cases with values close to 0. At the same 
time, the size of the shown risk might be considerably 
different, depending on the case. Thanks to this, the 
method is capable of raising the attention to special 
cases and orientate so that the simultaneous effects of 
the individual risk factors can be estimated.
While the use of weights lowers the variation in the 
case of the indices without respect of the interactions, 
variation is bigger in the indices considering the 
relationships compared to the not weighted methods. 
This method is capable of giving even more importance 
to the cases different from the usual, and raising 
the attention to hidden relationships (see Figure 1). 
Indirectly this verifies that there is a procedure that 
is capable of active management and articulation of 
hidden relationships. The weighting also expresses 
the relative importance and posed amount of threat by 
certain factors in certain moments.
The range of the results – the distance of the mini-
mum and maximum values – does not change, or gets 
larger with the insertion of interactions (also visible on 
the histograms). Therefore, the suggested method is 
creates the opportunity to raise attention to the cases 
differing from the average even more. 
Figure 1
The distribution of
weighted averages in the sample containing
all the control objectives
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The effect of the weighting of risks is smaller than 
that of the consideration of the interactions. Thus, the 
difference in the totals of the weighted and not weighted 
cases is smaller, than the amount of the effects of taking 
the interaction in consideration. 
Comparing the suggested index and the simpler 
methods shows that the index considering the 
interactions as well is usually even more different in 
the examination of the scenarios than in the case of 
the whole of the control objectives. (Figure 2) This 
confirms that, if the amount of available information 
is less, the importance of this method is even bigger 
in determining the appropriate measure. In the case of 
the scenarios, the avoidance of individual risks is less 
important than the consideration of their simultaneous 
effects. With the use of the index that is the result of 
the research, the critical coexistences that influence 
corporate risk are easier to spot. 
Thanks to the construction of the index, in the 
extreme cases (e.g. all factors are raising or all are 
lowering risk) there is no difference between the resulted 
values; at the same time in the cases in between, that 
are much more likely in real situations, the shift can be 
considerable.
 Confirmation of the assumption
The practical meaning of our assumption is that if 
the fact that audit methodologies are primarily based 
on practical experience is used, then, with the use of the 
information acquired in previous audits, better and more 
precise audit plans can be created. In other phrases: the 
assignment of control objectives in certain situations of 
examination can be done based on the experiences of 
previous audits. Additionally, the audit plans created 
in this way enable the cost-effective execution of 
audits, without sacrificing accuracy and reliability. The 
results of the simulation confirm that the index created 
in the described manner is capable of the appropriate 
measurement of risks. As the creation of a risk index 
with the consideration of interactions succeeded; the 
self-reflecting quality of auditing was usable in creating 
the audit plan. Therefore our assumption is confirmed. 
Knowledge reusability conclusions
As it is possible to create a cumulated risk index that 
considers the simultaneous effects of individual risk 
factors, a new method for the assessment of corporate 
risks is enabled. With the use of such metrics, previously 
unidentifiable risks can be brought into front. In some 
cases areas that remained hidden when using traditional 
methods, can now be considered of higher risk that 
need further investigation. 
All this results in the possibility for corporate 
management to get a better and more accurate ima-
ge of the information technology risk level of the 
organization. Because of the consideration of the 
relationships of risk factors, this suggested index is 
more capable of comprehensive assessment of larger 
areas, ranges consisting of more sources of risk in 
the company. This may be a tool in the hand of the 
management that allows the correction of strategy on 
a more objective basis.
It has become clear that the results of previous 
audits are usable in making more accurate and more 
purposeful audit plans. If the already examined 
areas and the relations on these are taken into 
consideration, it is possible to set up scenarios that 
employ the interactions of individual risk factors 
and their effects on overall risk. This also enables 
the more accurate designation of the critical areas 
regarding the examination. In this way, it is possible 
to create better audit plans that are easier to execute 
than previous ones. 
Figure 2
The distribution of
the R index in the sample containing
all the control objectives
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If these data, the results of auditing, and their 
confirmation by indices are available, it becomes 
possible for corporate management to optimally 
distribute the resources related to information 
technology. The limited assets of the company can be 
used in such way, that IT risk management receives the 
most benefits possible. 
It has to be noted, that the exploration of the results 
is not enough to realize the advantages mentioned 
above. In order that the executives be able to interpret 
the results, it is necessary to bring them to a format 
that is understandable for them; to “translate” these 
into the appropriate language. Therefore the tasks of 
the auditors do not end at creating the risk index. It 
is a further duty to put the results in an appropriate 
context, providing a handhold for corporate executives 
in the interpretation. 
It has been confirmed that by employing the 
suggested index, the identification of such IT-related 
and strategically important areas is achievable that 
were indefinable with the use of traditional methods. 
This is primarily made possible by the fact that the 
consideration of joint effects of risk factors enables 
the perception of such co-existences that are important 
from the corporate strategy point of view, but which 
were impossible to discover due to the too few 
dimensions of risk indices.
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